Abstract
Introduction Democracy and corruption as a matter of governance
Independently of the type of government, corruption exists. But the relationship between democracy and corruption is that the latter cannot exist without a high degree of democracy. Otherwise, it would be a flawed democracy or an autocracy. The approach of Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) helps us understand the link between both concepts, which considers two governance orders in a society. The first, when particularism rules with an institutional corruption; the second, when ethical universalism rules with an individual corruption. What differs one from the other is the allocation of public resources. In a modern democracy, the ethical universalism may be an ideal, because it tends to benefit all groups in regards to all levels of development.
Corruption may be considered a systemic problem in any region of the world due to its multiple causes and consequences. Lambsdorff identifies at least nine of its causes: "(…) the size of the public sector, the quality of regulation, the degree of economic competition, the structure of government, the amount of decentralization, the impact of culture, values and gender, and the role of invariant features such as geography and history " (2006: 4) . Besides these consequences, there are other somewhat institutional and behaviourist ones. One could highlight, for instance, the negative impact in GDP and several economy sectors, the damage of confidence in institutions and deepening of the social inequalities (OECD, 2013) .
In what concerns the democratic conception of corruption, Warren (2004) proposes one that covers not only the political power, as well as the public sphere. Under his view, democracy implies inclusion while corruption implies exclusion from collective decisions.
Considering this finding, states with high democratic development that face corruption cases would develop better mechanisms to avoid that the society is affected.
In Latin America there is a tie between corruption levels and support of democracy; as well as satisfaction with a democratic regime, mainly due to its evident negative impact. Morales (2009) concludes that victimization by the corruption of citizens explains more their satisfaction with democracy, rather than their democracy support.
As Holmes and Piñeres (2006) propose, understanding the theoretical model of democratic development implies to go beyond a minimalist view to a comprehensive concept of democracy, focused on the assessment of its political, social and economic variables. Their model includes four categories: human capital, democratic health, democratic inclusiveness and economic and political security. However, a limitation of that model is that it lacks an aggregate indicator with an international scope about the degree of democratic development in the states. 
Democratic development
Nowadays the region faces several challenges to improve its democratic development.
In this regard, the Democracy Index 2014 concludes that the rampant crime, particularly the violence and drug-trafficking as well as the corruption, have had the most negative impact on democracy development. Since its first publication in 2006, the overall score for the region has remained stagnant, ranging between flawed democracies and hybrid regimes (EIU, 2015) .
Within the crisis of the democracy debate, the post third-wave of democratization in Latin America has been discussed. Mainwaring and Perez-Liñan (2015) concluded that the problem is not a stagnation of the 20 Latin American states evaluated in the Freedom House Index, but rather their persistent low quality of democracy. This explains that between the period of 2002-2013 the average difference in scores of the states was -0.8%, and the region score decreased from 66.5 to 66.1 (115-123). As such, the achieved advances have not been constant, but instead they have passed through a cycle of advances, setbacks and stagnation.
Besides the approaches regarding the quality of democracy, there are also studies of the region related to the political situation in Latin American states and the major challenges that they face. A report elaborated by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2014) identifies a contrasted scenario marked by the economic inequality and an uneven quality of democracy caused by insecurity and institutional weakness. As the halfempty glass metaphor, the region combines high support but low satisfaction with democracy by citizens.
In addition, low confidence in public institutions and high corruption perception of political parties are a latent problem. Another study, by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2014) , concludes that insecurity remains the second most important problem before the economy. As to those surveyed who perceived corruption in public sector, the mean remains between 70% and 73% since 2004. The citizen justice increased from 28.9% in 2012 to 32% in 2014. About this problem, Zizumbo-Colunga (2015) identifies that it is mainly related to the victimization by police corruption (r= .436) and crime (r= .479). 
Corruption as a problem
In Latin America, there are significant efforts towards fighting corruption. In our analysis, we rely on two important hemispheric legal instruments. The first with a regional scope is the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC), signed in Venezuela (1996) .
The second with an international scope is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption The information generated from the MESICIC and the COSP highlights more the advances than the setbacks of the implementation of both conventions by the member states.
Both are transitioning toward non-ranking assessment methods that go beyond the perception.
Their functions are the half part of an integral anticorruption system regarding assessment, technical assistance and recommendations. The other half part of the system is the government's responsibilities in regards to prevention, complaint, investigation, penalty and compensation for damages.
Method Research question and hypothesis
Based on the relationship between democracy and corruption, we propose here the 
Democratic development indicators
To know the degree of democratic development in the region, there are several yearly The most rigorous in theory, updated and robust in methodology may be the IDD-LAT.
Its 33 indicators are clustered in four dimensions: political rights and civil liberties; institutional quality and political efficiency; social welfare; and economic efficiency. The sample of 18 states meets the base criteria for considering them democratic (free elections, universal suffrage and full participation). Thus, it excludes Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago.
A special criterion for its data collection is that the sources are available for public and officially validated. Table 2 shows the IDD-LAT scores for each state by year and the difference during the period of 2002-2014.
Corruption perception indicators
It was until the final years of the 20th century when methodologically robust indicators were created to measure the perception of corruption. Among those which remain in force with an international scope are the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), resulting from the combination of expert surveys; and the Corruption Barometer, composed only from one public questionnaire about perception and experience with public corruption, both made by Transparency International. Aside from these, the Worldwide Governance Indicators "Control of corruption" (WGI-CC, 2015) made by the World Bank, is an index that measures the perceived corruption both on public and private sector. In addition to those, there are some others with a regional scope that include at least one item about corruption perception in their method: such as Latinobarómetro, the Americas Barometer and the Rule of Law Index.
Although the Corruption Barometer could be analysed as an indicator of corruption perception of the non-expert public, it is omitted due to its two methodological limitations. The first is that it covers a period from 2003 to 2013, two years less compared with the WGI. The second is its data, which lacks an overall score for each state for a group of questions. The CPI is also omitted because it is not possible to compare across time the scores before 2012.
According with Stephenson (2015) , the improving or worsening in the states' scores over a period depends on the significance of its overall mean. Despite this, the WGI-CC represent a better option to make a cross-time and cross-country comparison of the scores for Latin America. It is composed of six dimensions which aggregate among 5 and 17 representative sources. The 'Control of corruption' dimension measures the extent to which public power is Once the variables of democratic development and corruption perception during the period have separately been described, it is necessary to know how they are correlated by state.
This will enable to understand if the first hypothesis is confirmed or rejected, i.e. that while the states were more democratic, less corruption perception they had. For this, a Pearson productmoment correlation coefficient is applied between the scores of IDD-LAT and WGI-CC in 2014. In the appendix, table 3 shows the coefficients of the model. 
Results and discussion
In regards to (2005), a limitation of the CPI 12 is not only the difficulty to measure the impact of anti-corruption policies on the perception, but also the opinion of the surveyed experts on the spreading of corruption cases at that moment. The anticorruption legal 12 As well as of the other corruption perception indicators.
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~ 47 ~ reforms present methodological challenges in measuring their direct impact on corruption levels, and the comparative impact of their type of intervention (Chêne, 2015) . Despite this, there are successful experiences/lessons on specific legal and institutional conditions.
In regards to the linear regression, Once rejected the three hypotheses based on statistical models, it is necessary to understand in depth the democratic setback in Latin American states by resorting to an analytic approach. With the purpose to identify the circumstances in which the struggle against corruption is present, a sample of Latin American states was selected to be analysed. The criteria for selecting them were three: To be members of the IACAC and the UNCAC; experiencing at least one case of corruption at the national level in the past two years; and, having experienced a national strategy to fight this problem. In alphabetic order, the states selected were Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. Even if the states of Haiti, Venezuela or Paraguay have a higher corruption perception in WGI CC, they were not selected because they have not experienced a massive case of corruption (at the national level), but, instead, an institutionalized and deep-rooted corruption scheme.
The cases of corruption in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico
A common feature of these states is their different scores of both IDD-LAT 2014 with 4,197; 8,523; 876; and 5,019; and WGI-CC 2014 with -0.38; 1.48; -0.70; and -0.73 respectively.
Their governments recently have faced alleged or proven accusations of corruption. 13 The source of this indicator is the CPI for 2013. It does not represent collinearity because it is not included as a source in the WGI-CC. has not produced criminal sentences yet, it proposed an electoral reform to cover legal loopholes. A key role of the civil society and universities will be to spread the judiciary system functions through an observatory (OAS, 2016).
The case in Mexico implied a potential conflict of interest between the President
Enrique Peña Nieto, his wife and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. In response to that, the President appointed the Ministry of Secretary of Public Administration, a federal institution focused on internal control. At the same time, he received the President's order to investigate the case. Though the results concluded that there was not any crime (SFP, 2015) , it left doubts among the public opinion. Another response to that case and to the systemic problem of corruption was an anticorruption reform, created by the Congress of the Union (DOF, 2016) with the support of a coalition of civil society organizations. It contained the design of a National Anti-Corruption System with stronger capacities to prevent, investigate and punish corruption crimes in all government levels in a coordinated way, including citizen participation, private sector sanctions and a better audit model of public resources. A key norm led by the civil society was the Ley 3 de 3, a new legal framework of public servant's responsibilities that aims to reduce the impunity (another problem associated with the corruption in Mexico). In fact, the Global Impunity Index 16 ranks the state as the second in the world where the law does not produce enough punishments to the crime (IGI, 2015) .
Once presented the cases related to the states selected, we will now add more details about them. In Brazil, a political and economic crisis put at risk the democratic advances in the medium term. Chile has held the first rank in the IDD-LAT and the WGI-CC among the Latin In sum, the impact of corruption cases tends to oscillate depending on how the government reacts, not only with anti-corruption policies but also with democratic tools. In 
Conclusions
The key finding of this research is that the three hypotheses proposed are temporary rejected, until other hypotheses contradict them. Probably based on another method they may be confirmed. It was evident the relationship among democratic states with less corruption perception and more effective policies against it. Chile is an example. URY 10,000 9,766 7,517 8,355 8,397 9,384 8,717 9,262 9,732 8,907 9,612 
